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From [text] to [Work]
A critical re-presentation of 
“From Work to Text” 









A candid and multi-faceted 
conversation between
The Optics of Me
Through the image the world asserts its discontinuity, 
its fragmentation, its artificial instantaneousness.
—Jean Baudrillard 
from “For Illusion Isn’t he Opposite of Reality”, Photographies 1985-1998, 2000. 
A paramount politic involved in making art is the making of meaning. To accomplish this, 
art must problematically divorce itself from context; efacing the traces of its environment 
and even its visuality. In order to construct an image or a text of the world we must essen-
tially remove ourselves from the world. he photographer stands outside the frame. he 
painter exists upon the canvas. he cinema crats ‘another world,’ a non-place for logic and 
sensory deprivation. In this way, the activity of creating aesthetic experiences, while vir-
tuous, is complicated in a politics of what is represented and what is not. Artists select a 
particular vantage point from a multitude and then attempt to render a perpetually moving 
reality through a inite unreality. As a result, images and texts become autonomous because 
they propose to document the world. hey are no longer a part of it. he continuous pro-
duction of images and texts yields a “contiguity of fragmentation” and a plurality of repre-
sentations. [1] Like the thaw of some epic frozen lake, this plurality splits the image/text 
into fractals, forever dividing into smaller yet ininite possibilities of themselves. 
Artists are not the only ones adding to this immense contiguity, however. As illuminated by 
many French poststructural theorists such as Roland Barthes, Jean Baudrillard and Jacques 
Derrida, the use of language is an intrinsically fragmentary behaviour. Grammar and syntax 
are only conventions that we agree upon. Letters on a page are utterly meaningless until we 
decide that they must mean something. And still, despite these longstanding conventions, 
language can easily break. It can fail to create a connection. Words can mimic and betray 
other words, and identities suddenly transform through accent and dialect. It poses a kind 
of metaphysical quandary: How best to envision a force that expresses only as much as it 
negates? And so, just as the image divorces its own environment, language divorces its own 
employment. Images and texts are the interstitial spaces that precariously join the frag-
ments of a kaleidoscopic existence.
In this monthly, our contributors are concerned with the role that aesthetics play in the for-
mation of these interstitial spaces. How does a particular regime of taste or style inluence 
how plural or fractal an artistic expression becomes? Each article also seeks to be relexive 
about its inevitable fragmentation of meaning and represen-
tation through its format as well as the style and voice of the 
writing. 
In Lindsay LeBlanc’s “From [text] to [Work]” she re-pres-
ents Roland Barthes’ hallmark 1971 essay, “From Work 
to Text.” In it, Barthes argues for a sea change in the way 
that processes of ‘reading’ and ‘writing’ can be understood, 
wherein images and even three-dimensional objects are 
forms of texts to be read. He denounces classiications by 
time period, style, form, etc., explaining that they fail to ac-
count for the fact that their very concepts (signiied) rely on 
a semblance of signiiers (sign). LeBlanc critiques Barthes’ 
ideas and utterances through a considered series of black-
outs, strikethroughs, highlights and insertions. By specii-
cally introducing the words “Art,” “artwork” and “aesthetics” 
she also reframes Barthes’ propositions as instructions for 
reading the text of artistic practice. 
“hy Lovely Stain” by Penny Leong Browne continues this 
strain of considering the object as a text and conversely the 
text as an object. Inspired both by her own art practice of 
meticulous stain-making and the anti-aesthetic artwork of 
Marcel Duchamp, she addresses the idea of the abject and 
how it comes into representation. Writing sometimes as her-
self, sometimes from the perspective of the artwork and yet 
other times somewhere nebulous between, Leong Browne 
accentuates how aesthetic experiences can be jarring amal-
gamations of impressions, memories and bodily stimuli. To 
relect the psychological and cybernetic concepts that she 
deploys, her writing also resembles an assemblage or a kind 
of textual Frankenstein. houghts are stitched together 
through poetic syntax and sentence fragments. Paragraphs 
densely packed with ideas about confronting the image of 
the Other are intentionally only hinged together so that any 
one might swing the anxious reader outward, elsewhere. 
In my conversation with Canadian visual and performance 
artist Zeesy Powers, pieces of our dialogue are shuled, in-
terrupted and expanded (through interaction with the doc-
ument) to better portray the fragmentary, multi-modal ex-
perience of participating in an interview.  Speaking at length 
about her practice, which largely examines issues of 
language, intimacy and aesthetics of the body, Powers’ 
responses are reorganized into a non-linear ‘portrait’ of 
the event, including notations and illustrations about 
the weather, the bartender and even the background 
music. Elements of what is implicitly seen, heard and 
felt in this instance take on an equal importance as the 
explicit gestures of question and answer.
In many ways, to straddle the line between implicit 
and explicit is the charge of the savvy artist and author. 
he discontinuity of image and text is a duplicitous 
doctrine—as wondrously realistic in its iction as it is 
obfuscating to our sense of reality as a whole. When 
we are inally forced to reconcile the idea that reality 
is not a whole, our vision of self, of other, of one and 
many is fundamentally challenged.  As the title of this 
prologue implies, some assemblage is required on the 
reader’s part within this monthly to make these pur-
posely discombobulated texts ‘work.’ But do not work 
too hard to make things it. In the (shockingly) salient 
words of Deleuze and Guattari: “hese combinations 
are neither genetic or structural; they are interking-
doms, unnatural participations. hat is the only way 
Nature operates—against itself.” [2]

Remarks
Source text: “From Work to Text” by Roland Barthes (1971) translation by Stephen Heath (1977)
Disclaimer: he source text has been manipulated here with some omissions and additions
Where you see italics you see the interventionist
his is a text not written by Barthes nor someone else
To the Modern, dead and alive
It is a fact that a certain change will should could take place 
(or is taking place) in our conception of art (improper) lan-
guage and, consequently, of the (art) work, which owes at 
least its phenomenal existence to the former. he should 
change is clearly connected with a lack of development in 
(amongst other disciplines) linguistics proper nouns (the 
term connection is used here in a deliberately neutral way: 
one does not decide a determination, be it multiple and di-
alectical only suggests it). What is new and which afects 
the idea of the (art) work comes not necessarily from the 
re[deinition] of art Art but rather or also from Art’s en-
counter in relation to an object which traditionally is the 
province of art improper. Art improper is a term I use in re-
ferring to all art before Art. Art (proper noun) is only a surre-
ality, a space between: can we call it a product of a naïve ide-
alism? It is indeed as though the interdisciplinarity which 
is today held up as a prime value cannot accomplish by the 
simple confrontationof specialist branches of aesthetic 
knowledge. Interdisciplinarity is not the calm of an easy 
security; it [began] efectively when the solidarity of the 
[canon] [broke] down in the interests of a new object and 
a new language, neither which has a place in the ield of the 
sciences Art (now). It is precisely this uneasiness with clas-
siication which permits the diagnosis of a certain muta-
tion perversion improper. he ‘improper’ which has seized 
the idea of the (art) work must not, however, be oveunder-
restimated: it is more in the nature of an epistemological 
slide [glissement] than of a re_break. he break is seen to 
have taken place  since then there has been no new breaks, 
so that in a way it can be said that for __________ we have 
been living in repetition _________________________. 
What History, our History, allows us today is merely to 
slide, to vary, to exceed, to repudiate. Just as Einsteinian 
science demands that ‘the relativity of the frames of refer-
ence’ be included in the objects studied, so the combined 
action of Marxism, Freudianism, and structuralism Histo-
ry demands, in art (Art), the relativization of the relations 
of ___________________. Over against the traditional 
notion of the (art) work (improper), there is now the re-
quirement of a new object (Art) Work (proper noun), ob-
tained by the sliding or overturning of former categories. 
hat object former categories is the text. I know the word 
is fashionable (I am myself oten led to use it), and therefore 
regarded by some with suspicion; but that is exactly why I 
should like to remind myself of the principal propositions 
at the intersection of which I see the text (Art) Object 
Work standing. In order, perhaps, to ind the space between. 
he word “proposition” is to be understood here more in a 
grammatical than in a logical sense: the following are not 
argumentations, but enunciations, “touches” as it were, 
yellow highlights  Key terms and reoccurring terms; terms to hang onto while reading the text.
blackouts:    Attention to the obstruction and omission of Barthes, leaving a space for the reader 
   and opportunity for inference or insertion. 
strikethrough   An acting out of the conlict between myself and Barthes as the original author—
   keeping Barthes present in the text through the transparency of my own presence.
bold    Ideas of emphasis, parallel to the yellow highlights but further from core concepts.
italics   Asides; my own notes.
Click this box to close it.
approaches that consent to remain metaphorical surreal. Here then are these propositions: they concern meth-
od, genres, signs, plurality, iliation, reading, and pleasure.
       (1) 
he text Work proper is not to be thought of as an object that can be computed. It would be futile to try to sep-
arate materially Works from texts. In particular, one must avoid the tendency to say: the Work is classic, the text 
avant-garde; the Work is not a question of drawing up a crude honors list in the name of [a new] modernity and 
declaring certain literary productions “in” and others “out” by virtue of their chronological situation: there may 
not be Work in a very ancient work, while many products of contemporary art improper are in no way Works. 
he diference is the following: the Work is a fragment of substance, the sublime, perhaps – I’m inclined to inte-
grate notations on Kant, but the mention of his name seems adequate occupying a portion of the space of books (in 
a library, for example, and where I currently write this); the text on the other hand is a methodological ield noun 
improper. And so, the text parallels art improper. he opposition may recall (without at all reproducing term for 
term) Lacan’s distinction between “reality” and “the real”: the one is displayed, the other demonstrated the Art 
Work is the space between [‘La realite se montre, le reel se de-montre’]; the Work can [not always] be seen, the Text 
is a may be a process of demonstration, speaks according to certain rules (or against certain rules); the Work can 
be held in the hand, the text is held or in language, only may exist in the movement of discourse (or rather, it is 
Work for the reason that it knows itself as Work); Art is not the decomposition of art, it is art improper that is 
the imaginary tail of Art proper. Or again: he Work is experienced only in an activity of production. It follows 
that the Work cannot stop; its constitutive movement is that of cutting across (the space between).
       (2) 
In the same way, the Work does not stop at (good) Literature; it cannot be contained in a hierarchy, even in a 
simple division of genres. What constitutes the Work is, on the contrary (or precisely), its subversive force in 
respect of the old [lack of ] classiications (proper nouns). How does one classify Georges Bataille? Is this writer 
a novelist, a poet, an essayist, an economist, a philosopher, a mystic? he answer is so di cult that the literary 
manuals generally prefer to forget about Bataille who, in fact, wrote texts, perhaps continuously one single text. 
If the Work poses problems of classiication where is the space between? (which is furthermore one of its should 
limit its “social” functions) this is because it always involves a certain experience of limits the sublime (to take 
up an expression from Philippe Sollers Kant). hibaudet used to speak – but in a very restricted sense – of lim-
it-works: the Work is that which goes to the limit of beyond the rules of enunciation (rationality, readability, 
etc.) Nor is this a rhetorical idea, resorted to for some “heroic” efect?: the Work tries to place itself very exactly 
behindyond the limit of the doxa (is not general opinion—constitutive of our democratic societies and power-
fully aided by mass communications—deined by its limits, its energy of exclusion, its censorship?)
       (3)
he Work can be approached, experienced, in reaction to the Sign. he Work closes on a signiied the gap be-
tween signiier and signiied (it is both). here are two modes of signiication which can be attributed to this 
signiied: either it is claimed to be evident and the work is then the object of a literal science, of philology tau-
tology; or else it is considered to be secret, ultimate, something to be sought out, and the work then falls under 
the scope of a hermeneutics, of an interpretation (Marxist, psychoanalytic, thematic, etc.) entities Stein; in short, 
the Work itself functions as a Sign proper and it should not represent an institutional category of the civilization 
of the sign improper. he text, on the contrary, practices the ininite deferment of the signiied, is dilatory; its 
ield is that of the signiier and the signiier must not be conceived of as “the irst stage of meaning,” its material 
vestibule, but, in complete opposition to this, as its deferred action [apres-coup]. Similarly, the ininity of the sig-
niier refers not to some idea of the inefable (the unnameable signiied) but to that of a playing meaninglessness 
identity not entity; the generation of the perpetual signiier in the ield of the text (or better, of which the text is 
the ield) is realized not according to an organic progress of maturation or a hermeneutic course of deepening in-
vestigation, but, rather, according to a serial movement of disconnections, overlappings, variations. he logic 
regulating the improper may be comprehensive (to deine “what the work means”), or metonymic; the activity of 
associations, contiguities, cross-references coincides with a liberation of symbolic energy (with only symbol man 
would die): he Work (in the best of cases) is anti symbolic (its symbolic runs out, comes to a halt its aim is to 
evade symbolism, the little dog - Stein); the text is radically symbolic: a work conceived, perceived, and received 
in its integrally symbolic nature is a text (improper). hus is the text restored to language; like language, it is 
structured but decentered, without closure (note, in reply to the contemptuous suspicious of the “fashionable” 
sometimes directed at structuralism, that the epistemological privilege currently accorded to language stems 
precisely from the discovery there of a paradoxical idea of structure a system with neither end nor center) (he 
proper: end and center) 
 
       (4) 
he Work is singular. Which is not simply to say that it has one meaning, but that it accomplishes the very plural 
of meaning              ∞: an irreducible (and not merely an acceptable) singular. he Work is not a coexistence of 
meanings but a passage, a traversal; thus it answers not to an interpretation, even a liberal one, but to an explo-
sion, a dissemination itself. he singular of the Work depends, that is, not on the ambiguity of its contents, but 
on what might be called the stereographic plurality of its weave of signiiers (etymologically, the text is a tissue, 
a woven fabric) a lost dog. he reader of the Work may be compared to someone at loose wits ends (someone 
slackened of from the “imaginary” reality); this passablyively empty subject strolls (it is what happened to the 
author of these lines, then it was that [s]he had a vivid idea of the Work) on the side of a valley, an oued lowing 
down below (oued is there to attest to a certain feeling of unfamiliarity Derrida); what [s]he perceives is text: 
multiple, irreducible, coming from a disconnected, heterogeneous variety of substances and perspectives. All 
these incidents are identiiable; they come from codes which are known but their combination is unique, found-
ing the stroll in an indiference repeatable only as indiference. So the Work: it can be itself only in its diference 
(the unidentiiable between), its reading is semelfactive (this rendering illusory any inductive-deductive science 
of texts – no “grammar” of the Work) and nevertheless woven entirely with citations, references, echoes: cultural 
languages (what language is not?), antecedent or contemporary, which the Work traversenscends: it through 
and through in a vast he interspace in which every Work is held, it itself being the in-between of another text, 
is not to be confused with some origin: to try to ind the “sources”, the “inluences” of a Work, is to fall in with 
the myth of iliation; the citations which go to make up a Work are anonymous, untraceable ∞ and its inverse, 
and yet already read [deja-lues]: they are not quotations only quotation marks. he Work has nothing disturbing 
for any monistic philosophy; for a Work is a sort of monistic philosophy: a singular knowing, but perhaps quiet in it 
plural is Evil. Against the Work, therefore, the text could well take as its motto the words of the man possessed 
by demons (Mark 5: 9): “My name is Legion: for we are many.” he demonic or plural texture which opposes 
text to Work can bring with it fundamental changes in reading, proper nouns possess, don’t borrow and precisely 
in areas where monologism appears to be the Law: certain of the “texts” of the Holy Scriptures traditionally 
recuperated by theological monism (historical or anagogical) will perhaps ofer themselves to a difraction of 
meanings (inally, that is to say, to a materialist reading), while the Marxist interpretation of works, so far reso-
lutely monistic, will be able to materialize itself more by pluralizing itself (if, however, the Marxist “institutions” 
allow it).
       (5) 
he Work is caught up in a process of iliation self relexivity: Postulated here are: a determination of the work 
by the world (by race, then by History) a consecution of works amongst themselves, and the onto- “being, to be, 
I am” of the work by the Author. he Author is reputed the Father and the owner of his Work: literary science 
therefore teaches respect for the manuscript and the Author’s declared intentions, while society asserts the legal-
ity of the relation of author to work (the “droit d’auteur” or “copyright” is in fact fairly recent; it was only really 
legalized at the time of the French Revolution). As for the text art improper, it reads without the inscription 
of the Father. Here again, the metaphor of the improper separates from the metaphor of the proper: the latter 
refers to the image of an organism (entity) which grows by vital expansion, by “development” (a word which is 
signiicantly ambiguous, at once biological and rhetorical, a becoming; the metaphor of the improper (text) is 
that of the network; if the (text) extends itself, it is a result of a combinatory systematic a composite identity, of 
many (an image, moreover, close to current biological conceptions of the living being). Hence, no vital “respect” 
is due to the text: it can be broken (which is just what the Middle Ages did with two nevertheless authoritative 
texts, the Holy Scriptures and Aristotle); it can be read without the guarantee of its Father, if only because it is 
a product of many, the restitution of the inter-text paradoxically abolishing any legacy                                               . 
It is not that the Author may not “come back” in the text, in his text, but he then does so only as a “guest” so to 
speak: If he is a novelist, he is inscribed in the novel like one of his characters, igures in the carpet; no longer 
privileged, paternal, alethelogical, but ludic. He becomes, as it were, a “paper-author”: his life is no longer the 
origin of his work transcended by his Work (proper), but a iction source contributing to his work; there is a 
reversion of the work on to the life (and no longer the contrary); it is the work of Proust, of Genet which allows 
their lives to be read as a text. he “bio-graphy” reacquires a strong, etymological sense, and at the same time, the 
sincerity of the enunciation – the veritable “cross” borne by literary morality – becomes a false problem: the I 
which writes the (improper), it too, is never more than a paper I. 
       (6) 
he (art) work (improper) is normally the (digestible) object of consumption; I intend no demagogy here in 
referring to the so-called consumer culture, but it has to be recognized that today it is the quality of the work 
(which supposes inally an appreciation of “taste”) and not the operation of reading itself which can diferentiate 
between books: structurally, there is no diference between “cultured” reading and casual reading in trains. he 
Work (if only by its frequent “unreadability∞”) decants the work (the work permitting) from its consumption 
and gathers it up as play, activity, production, practice. his means that the Work requires that one try to abolish 
(or at the very least to diminish) increase the distance between improper and proper the everyday and Art in no 
way by intensifying the projection of the Author onto the work but by joining them in a single signifying prac-
tice. he distance separating reading and writing is historical. In the times of the greatest social division (before 
the setting up of democratic cultures) reading and writing were equally privileges of class engagement. Rheto-
ric, the great literary code of those times, taught one to write (even if what was then normally produced were 
speeches, not texts). Signiicantly, the coming of democracy improper reversed the word of command: what was 
the (secondary) School critical prides itself on is teaching to read engage (well) and no longer to write produce 
Author deine (consciousness of the deiciency is becoming fashionable again today: the teacher is called upon 
to teach pupils to “express themselves” which is a little like replacing a form of repression by a misconception). 
In fact, reading, in the sense of consuming, is far from playing (re) deining with the text Art (Work) (proper). 
Playing Deinition must be understood here in all its polysemy shades: the Work itself plays deines (like a door, 
like a machine with “play”) efects deinition (a knowing) and deines itself and the reader deines locates? the 
deinitionoutline of a between-space (sublimity) in the Work as one plays a game, looking for a knowing and 
un-knowing, diference and indiference (distinterestedness) but, in order that the practice not be reduced to a pas-
sive, inner mimesis (the Work is precisely that which resists such a reduction), also: playing deining the Work 
in a musical sense of the term. he history of music (as a practice, not as an “art”) does indeed parallel that of the 
Work fairly closely: there was a period when practicing amateurs were numerous (at least within the conines of 
a certain class) and “playing” and “listening” formed a scarcely diferentiated activity; then two roles appeared 
in succession, irst that of the interpreter to whom the bourgeois public (though still itself able to play a little 
– the whole history of piano) delegated its playing, then that of the (passive) amateur, who listens to music 
without being able to play (the gramophone record takes the place of the piano). We know that today post-serial 
music has radically altered the role of the “interpreter,” who is called on to be in some sort the coauthor of the 
score, completing it rather than giving it “expression.” he Work is very much a score of this new kind: it asks 
of the reader a practical collaboration listener? vital respect experience. Which is an important change, for who 
executes the work? Nowadays only the critic institution executes the work (I admit the play on words). he re-
duction of readingart to a consumptioninstitution is clearly responsible for the boredom experiences by many 
in the face of the modern contemporary (unreadable) digestible text, the (post) avant-garde ilm or painting: to 
be bored means that one cannot produce the text, play it, open it out, set it going meet it as an equal, a product 
of culture industry (Adorno)
       (7) 
his leads us to pose (to propose) a inal approach to the Work (proper noun): that of pleasure. I do not know 
whether there has ever been a hedonistic aesthetics (eudaemonist philosophies are themselves rare). Certainly 
there exists a pleasure of the improper (of certain works); I can delight in reading and rereading Proust, Flaubert, 
Balzac, and even that which came before – why not? – Alexander Dumas. But this pleasure, no matter how keen 
and even when free from all prejudice, remains in part (unless by some exceptional critical efort) a pleasure from 
consumption before; for if I can read these authors, I also know that I cannot re-write them (that it is impossible 
today to write “like that”) and this knowledge, depressing enough, suices to cut me of from the production 
of these works, in the very moment their remoteness plurality establishes my boredom interest in the Work (is 
not to be modern to know clearly what cannot be started over again?). he Work, on the other hand, is not 
bound to jouissance, that is, to a pleasure without separation space between. Order of the proper noun, the Work 
participates in its own way in a social utopia; before History (supposing the latter does not opt for barbarism), 
the Work achieves, if not the transparency of social relations beyond-place and between-place, that at least of 
language relations: the Work is that space where no language [that] has a hold over any other, where languages 
circulate (keeping the circular sense of the term)                                   ∞.
hese few propositions, inevitably, do not constitute the articulations of a heory of the Work. his is not sim-
ply the result of the failings of the person here presenting them (who in many respects has anyway done no more 
than pick up what is being developed round about her). Rather, it stems from the fact that a theory of the Work 
cannot be satisied by a metalinguistic exposition: the destruction of it is its own metalanguage of aesthetics, or 
at least (since it may be necessary provisionally to resort to metalanguage) its calling into doubt inaccuracy, is 
part of the theory itself: the discourse on the Work should itself be nothing other than Work, research, textual 
activity an informed discourse, since the Work is that social space which leaves no language safe, outside, nor 
any subject: of the enunciation in position as judge, master, analyst, confessor, decoder. he theory of the Work 
can coincide only with a practice of writing autonomy.
Lindsay LeBlanc 
studies at Ontario College of Art & Design University (OCAD U) in Toronto. She 
inds romance in structured abstraction and (consequently) her research interests 




[Show tunes pumped through tiny speakers]
[Light wood and chrome]
[Distant din of a pinball machine]
Zeesy: We talked about this earlier… ...the problem of pre-
cision in anything…it’s a bit of joke.
Zach: Empiricism was a really damaging thing that hap-
pened to Western history and culture, because it demands 
an absolute truth. Where does the line between coinci-
dence and fact get drawn? It’s almost absurd to hear you 
recount these really obvious examples [of environmental 
disasters], and still people deny them and respond with: 
“Well, we need empirical evidence that this is actually the 
case” Don’t you just see it at that point? What happened to 
common sense? To logic or rational thinking?
But, what’s the diference between empiricism and rational 
thinking?
Well, empiricism demands physical evidence. Rational 
thinking can still be a sort of abstraction in the way that 
logic has no particular shape or substance—it’s theoretical. 
For example: he idea that if one sees light that there must 
be something emitting it. It’s theoretical, but it’s still logical. 
Empiricism, on the other hand, would say, “Show me exact-
ly what is emitting the light and then I’ll believe you. Prove 
it to me that this relationship is true.”
Hmm… very interesting…
[Annoyingly high-pitched vocals 
rush in from the background]
[~Veruca Salt ]
Maybe empiricism is just used as a crutch to allow shitty 
things to keep happening? Right? An empiricist would 
be like, “Oh. You know it’s gonna be really expensive to 
do an empirical study of this thing.” But that’s really just a 
façade. It’s an excuse to keep the machinery running.
…
Yeah. For sure. Science has to justify its own existence 
nowadays in the same way that Art does.
[lips smack]
Well, having worked for a research facility I can conirm 
that is very true. he process of applying for funding—to 
justify your existence—is very similar to the grant process 
of the art world, except that with Science you can draw on 
military funding. Whereas with Art…
 
[Laughing like an old, drunk sailor] 
Well, obviously, we need to ind ways to integrate Art 
into War! hat’s the key! (sarcasm abounding) 
People are trying. here are deinitely artists who proit 
of the Military.
In propaganda? In technology? 
Both. here are deinitely creative companies that are 
contracted by the military to develop training modules. 
And those visuals, those products are used to…well, indi-
rectly, but to kill people…
[Ding!] 
[A wat of fried onions unfurls from the kitchen]
[Radio silence]
[Gulp of beer]
So, irst, I think it’s important to establish how you view 
the relationship between aesthetics and politics, in gen-
eral, and then more speciically in your own work. Many 
art historians, theorists and critics have argued that there 
is an inherent politic to the act of making art. Would you 
agree with that?
Sure. But, that politic depends so much on context. 
Where are you making this art? What are you making it 
out of ? Under what conditions? And, of course, who is it 
for? Obviously, making art involves some degree of poli-
tics. But, it can become crippling to one’s practice to have 
to think about that all the time. I think that the artists 
I admire most—their work, at it’s core, is always about 
that… …But the people who are doing it best are living 
very principled lives to achieve it. [I think] And I can’t 
lay any claim to that. I’m pretty self-interested. I’m pretty 
‘normal’ in that sense.
But that’s still a political position. And as you’re implying, 
if artists who are not making explicitly political work are 
becoming a minority, that becomes your subject position. 
It’s what Deleuze was always talking about—this tarrying 
of the one and the many, and consequently what the idea 
of representation means when in-between those poles.
he optics of me—being who I am—doing things like 
telling people what I think of them [as performance art] 
is very speciic. I’m a white lady who speaks really clean 
English. And I know that… …So, that’s [a position] being 
ofered [in the artworks]. People don’t necessarily have to 
know my personal history to know that I’m able to trade 
of of the way that I look. As we all are. We’re all able to 
do that to a certain extent. 
It’s a funny time. Visible issues and perceptions of class 
are, right now, a really big setback for most people. When 
in combination with other kinds of cultural barriers, es-
pecially language, or even more basic things like the na-
tionality printed on your passport, it can create incredible 
hurdles. At the same time, they’re not insurmountable. I 
still think there’s an immense amount of room for people 
to play with their identities and gain from that.
If you can speak in a polished way, present yourself in a 
polished way, speak polished English…and I don’t just 
mean speak ‘English’. I mean speaking particular types 
of English—any language for that matter—it’s crucial to 
gaining access to diferent areas of a culture. 
With this project (I Will Tell You Exactly What I hink 
Of You), I perform it in a lot of diferent contexts. But, 
for the most part, I perform it in galleries or other ine 
art contexts. And, generally, my audience and the people 
who eventually are drawn into participating in the piece 
come from the art world or have an ailiation. hey have 
knowledge of particular ways of speaking and presenting 
themselves. Or, there have been a lot of people from areas 
like philosophy and psychology. And I am not an expert 
in any of those…
hat depends on if you even believe in ‘experts’…
True. But I would also not describe myself as a person 
who has engaged in these ields with exceptional rigour. 
Ha, ha, ha!
[Some curmudgeon is yelling] 
[ Johnny Cash is strumming on the TV beside me.]
So, let’s talk more about this body of work then: 
I Will Tell You Exactly What I hink Of You is an ongoing 
series of performances that involve you expressing what 
could be deemed a litany of irst impressions in the form 
of a monologue about a (supposedly) total stranger. You 
began it as a one-on-one ‘service’ for a nominal fee, and 
then a live public performance piece and more recent-
ly adapted to a series of video performances, several of 
which you’ve published to your YouTube channel. In the 
video facet of the project you turn the camera on yourself 
and project a montage of what seem like random images 
behind you. However, in the live performance documen-
tation you point the camera at the participant. Can you 
talk about how you came to that decision, and what is sig-
niicant about the diference between these two formats?
I guess with this project—at its core—it doesn’t matter 
what iteration it’s gone through...each time, the partici-
pant is basically voiceless.
 I don’t wanna … I don’t want your love 
At every stage of it, when the participant attempts to re-
spond I have to remind them that it’s not actually about 
them. It’s not about that. I don’t actually care who they 
are or what they do for a living (unless I know them). 
But, even then—even in that context—it’s still a one-way 
street. So, when the camera’s turned on me, the person 
I’m talking about is always me. It’s not actually the person 
who’s participating.
[Is anyone participating?]
And by having the video on me I’m not really ‘outing’ 
anyone but myself. Maybe I am a little bit…if they under-
stand that I’m doing this to make a ‘public artwork’. But, 
even in the live version that I did for the Power Plant, 
when I chose to turn the camera onto the participants, 
they were still voiceless. But, what I had to say about them 
wasn’t included either. he piece was really about captur-
ing their reactions. Some people went as far as to perform 
themselves not caring. Some people didn’t have that level 
of self-consciousness—they just let themselves receive. 
Sometimes with very gentle, good humour. Sometimes 
shocked and appalled. But all these people have consent-
ed to this process. hey all have to sign a little piece of 
paper before they can be on camera.
Do you think they’re even listening to you?
Yeah. It’s crazy. I’m honestly waiting for the day when no-
body is willing to do this piece… 
On your website you’ve posted a few observations or ‘re-
lections’ about this series. And you said that once a wom-
an started crying when you said that she looked poor.
Yeah. hat was a performance that I did last year in the 
Bronx. And I was really nervous about this. I thought: 
New York art, New York audience; very sophisticated; 
they’re going to be very blazé about this…not at all the 
case… And these uncomfortable moments come with 
the territory. A lot of my projects involve working with 
people in vulnerable positions, or I’m intentionally plac-
ing people in vulnerable situations. You know: “I Will 
Tell You Exactly What I hink Of You”—that already 
sounds like you’re putting yourself in a vulnerable state. 
I occasionally do a project that’s a little bit more complex 
called, Subjects. It’s a project that very clearly makes peo-
ple uncomfortable. And it should. I don’t want people to 
participate who don’t understand that aspect or aren’t 
prepared for it. And, the irst time I shot the project there 
were a couple of people involved that it would be really 
easy to just look at them and listen to how they would 
describe themselves and to jot down a couple of obvious 
bullet points about who this person was, you would say, 
“Oh. Obviously. Vulnerable person!” 
[Flailing imaginary arms, like a drowning man at sea]
And they saw this as a platform to explain how they had 
been victimized. Yet, at the same time, they understood 
what it meant to be victimized by the system. It was a very 
transparent act. 
hey knew that I wasn’t there to help them. 
[Louis Armstrong sounds so good 
when the lights are this low]
[I blow out the candle between us]
[I’m talking too much with my hands]
At some points people have expressed concern that my 
projects are exploitative. And, I do not want to create that 
scenario. I will always turn away people who are obviously 
intoxicated or anyone who is obviously going through a 
psychotic meltdown.
 Have you had a lot of those cases?
Occasionally. I mean, if you propose an extreme scenario 
people in extreme states will respond to it. And I won’t 
work with people who are in extreme states like that. But 
the people who could be described as “authentically vul-
nerable”—like that’s trauma—I’ll work with those peo-
ple. But, they do have to be in a state where they’re self-
aware and relexive. And I’ll say to them very clearly, “You 
do understand that is for an art project?” And they’ll 
oten say to me, very point-blank, “Yes. hat’s why I’m 
doing this.”
he lipside of that is that I’ve also found there are people 
who come in and are like, “Oh yeah. Art. I’ll do you a 
favour and help you with your ‘art project’”. Sometimes, 
those are the people who have no awareness of what 
they’ve gotten themselves into… 
Once there was this woman who came in with her two 
friends. She was a social worker—highly trained—and 
suddenly she admitted something on camera that not 
even her closest friends had known. I ended up being the 
irst person she had actually ever told. I had to stop her 
and say, “Do you understand that this is on ilm. I’m go-
ing to include this in a publicly accessible art project?” 
And she also had to stop—actually stop—and consider 
that reality for the irst time, despite all the processes I 
had set up to make the nature of the work very explicit. 
Do you think that she was conscious in that moment, 
when she confessed that? I’m asking because I’m won-
dering if it’s really that people are compelled to confess 
secrets in front of strangers or that the camera somehow 
has a seductive power or urgency behind it that pushes 
people to expose themselves?
I’ve heard that about the camera before. I don’t necessar-
ily agree with it. But, over the past ive years we’ve seen 
this increasing ubiquity of cameras in our society. here’s 
so many cameras that it’s gotten to the point where even 
if it is on ilm there’s no guarantee that anyone’s going to 
actually see the footage. 
[A mug clinks against the table]
[My scarf is pooling on the lint-ridden loor]
And, in a circumstance like that, I really do think it has 
more to do with the kind of people who choose to engage. 
he people who have lived their lives understanding that 
they fall into a category of ‘vulnerable people’ understand 
what it really means to be a victim. Extremely cognizant 
of what it means to give a statement—on camera, to the 
police, to a social worker. hey understand what this pro-
cess means. And, now to be in a scenario where they have 
total agency over that process…
Do they have complete agency, though?
Well…
[A microwave beeps,
 or a truck backs up on the street corner]
[A landline ringtone beams down from a satellite]
But, I do want to ask a question about people in vulner-
able positions and purposely working with that, and also 
how you’re framing your subjects with the camera…
[Someone is whistling like Jiminy Cricket]
Many of your video works have a kind of ‘interview’ or 
‘talking head’ visual aesthetic to them, which can have a 
distancing efect. But then the way that you edit them—
the way that the clips of speech and image actually come 
together seems to be more about portraiture and an at-
tempt to visualize an inner self. Is this the goal?
I love the portrait as a form. I think that people are end-
lessly varied and endlessly similar as well. But there’s al-
ways going to be a unique aspect in a person. And that is 
what I’m trying to do—to seek it out. I also believe that 
anything an artist creates is always, in a way, a self-por-
trait. So, it’s hard to say if I’m getting an accurate picture. 
Because I’m working with others, the projects are also 
their portraits. here’s no true self-portrait. 
We have our inner life. And then there’s the way that oth-
ers perceive us. But then there’s something in between—
how we integrate and it into our surroundings. How we 
function as social beings. And in some ways, I feel like 
my practice is an extended learning of becoming self-crit-
ical, and in a constructive way—a challenge to see outside 
of myself but not be detached from it. here’s an oppor-
tunity there for a group portraiture, or a collective por-
traiture, or a kind of dual portrait that one can create, if 




Sorry… [nervous laughter] I just wanted to check the 
time… I don’t wanna draw this out past its due…
No, no, no. Let’s keep going.
[Ding!]
Zeesy Powers
Zeesy Powers is a Toronto-based interdisciplinary 
artist. She graduated from OCAD without a major 
and has consistently produced compelling works of 
art. Her artwork spans various mediums including 
video, performance and drawing and painting. Her 
work has been showcased in Toronto, Germany, 
Japan and the United States. Her talk show Breakfast 
with Zeesy featured interviews with artists, musi-
cians, activists and family members. Since 2007, her 
project I Will Tell You Exactly What I hink of You 
has been performed in Berlin, Los Angeles, Mon-
treal, New York and Toronto, and will be mounted 
again this spring in Vancouver. She is currently in 
development for Common Fate, a new projection 




he abject is the quality of things or the things themselves 
that we refuse as refuse— waste to discard, to forget. (As 
if it was possible.) Rejected from within, from mind and 
matter, the abject is origin “rejected.” From Latin: abjec-
tus, past participle of abicere ‘to reject.’ (1) Attempts to 
discard the matter of mind; the state of things that defy 
Beauty and Truth—these are futile in the insistence of 
the abject. As much as it is refused, it refuses to be ig-
nored. hrowaway it is not. he abject stares at us in the 
face, refusing to be refused. So we are forced to confront 
the abject, the undesired, uncomfortable, disturbing 
nature of being and things. (2) Against our instinct for 
self-preservation of the ego subjective, “I,” the abject is 
the confrontation of the Other, releasing the intersubjec-
tivity of “We” and thus ininite possibilities—the Virtual 
Self.  he Other is within us, inseparable—as the mir-
ror image renders not “I” but inlects many selves, many 
states of being human. As such, the  hegemony of Beauty 
gives way to the heterogeneity of the unbeautiful. Oh, 
such beautiful mash ups, intertwinings, random devia-
tions there are. 
To acknowledge the abject is to accept our own vulner-
ability as mortal, human creatures. he Otherness of 
body: Destructible lesh and organs. Sot and wet. Living 
matter against the inanimate. Wetware. he cyborgian 
monsters of Haraway. (3) he matter of life becoming 
through the abject—the deterioration, decay, and death 
of our human selves, becoming the impossible death of 
representation. 
Possible death, as matter that inlects, does not have a 
double image. Yet to refuse its representation is to fold 
the abject upon itself. A transcoding of light that de-
forms, mutates or interrupts its relection. Without its 
double, a re-presentation of death becomes possible 
again, even if only faintly so…
here is a boy with a rose unfurling on his cheek. A red 
stain that marks his lesh, unmistakably, undeniably his 
own. “[A] rose is a rose is a rose is a rose” is not a rose, as 
it is the bloom of the un-beautiful. (4) his is Beauty nei-
ther opposed or negated but un-made. he denied “rose” 
— it is not the thing it says. Denied itself from birth yet 
persistently present.
herein also lies the unwritten object— unwit-
tingly, the thing Other to itself that is foreign 
yet strangely familiar.  A Freudian dream of the 
Uncanny. Marble cubes, thermometer, cuttle-
bone and a painted metal birdcage –– a display 
of beautiful refusals. (5) Within the question-
ing title of Duchamp’s still-life assemblage Why 
Not Sneeze, Rose Sélavy? could be a statement 
of bricolage posing as abject becoming. 
his uncanny un-beautiful is the abject that can-
not be ignored, as it is ever present—latent, or 
in full bloom within the states of matter or in 
matter itself. Carbon  of dirt, water, plant, ani-
mal, insect, silver, trees, ash, meteor, lava, rock, 
skin, blood, lesh, hair, shell or bone. Alive or 
inanimate, the possession of the abject is abso-
lute. Forever reformulating, remixing or recon-
iguring in the present, the abject owns neither a 
past nor an origin, and therefore cannot be for-
gotten. he Frankenstein of matter—the abject 
is the monster that haunts our earthly dreams.
Life, intermingling with inanimate matter. 
Objectness of our human selves.
Monstrous, yet nevertheless a most gracious monstrosity, 
the abject embraces vulnerability and imperfection. 
he abject is incomplete. It is enthralled in the 
process of its own becoming. Decay in and unto 
itself—carbon matter deteriorating into ash and 
returning to carbon again. Indeinite and inde-
inable.
he abject reveals itself only in surprise. Its con-
dition of appearing is unpredictability.  Never to 
appear the same, the abject is a hallmark of its 
own originality. he rose blemish on the boy’s 
face is the original mark of a person. A DNA 
tattoo programmed cellular and inked in blood 
vessels. Animate matter. 
he stains I apply with oil and ash onto various 
surfaces of drywall, graph paper or canvas can 
only be produced by abandoning them. he ini-
tial act of placing the oil or ash water on paper 
begins the process. he stain is set in motion, 
bleeding slowly or quickly, depending on the 
viscosities of the oil and water. Interrupted by 
the grit of ash dust, it can take another course. 
Reaching the edge of the planar surface it blos-
soms, appearing authentically, a stain of its own 
becoming. By my very human hand however, I 
sometimes relent to the temptation of control, 
placing the angle of a brush or sponge at its wet 
edge. I attempt to coax the stain towards a par-
ticular direction, transparency or coniguration.  
I remain, however, cautious. Even a sleight of 
hand can arrest its becoming. his strange low-
er, the rose-denied, never to blossom.  A stillborn 
stain. he phantom of abjectness. 
Yet, if this strange lower is let to abandon, to blossom in its own uncanny (un)beauty, it will 
appear to us inevitably monstrous and alien. In spite of our inculcated desire for beauty we can 
be seduced, to love thy lovely stain.
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